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NOTES
"LIGHTS, CAMERA, ACTION":
VIDEOTAPING AND CLOSED-CIRCUIT
TELEVISION PROCEDURES COYLY
CONFRONT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT*
I. INTRODUCTION
A case that began with a two-year-old child's accusation
that he had been molested by teachers at the McMartin pre-
school brought sexual molestation of children into the forefront
of debate. The McMartin preschool case triggered an outcry by
society against sexual abuse of children and in fact "helped fuel
an overhaul of state laws."' Actual reports of sexual child abuse
are on the rise.2 Although the number of children who are vic-
tims of sexual abuse is impossible to estimate precisely, the
number of confirmed cases has skyrocketed. In 1976 there were
6,000 confirmed cases of sexual abuse of children. That number
jumped to 113,000 by 1985, just nine years later.' In a 1985 poll
taken by the Los Angeles Times, researchers found that 22% of
those questioned had been sexually abused as children.4 The
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Vance L. Cowden,
Clinical Professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law, for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this Note.
1. Gest & Fisher, Can the 'abused' kids be believed?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE-
PORT, July 27, 1987, at 10.
2. See Note, The Use of Videotaped Testimony of Victims in Cases Involving
Child Sexual Abuse: A Constitutional Dilemma, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 261 (1985) (citing
Galante, New War on Child Abuse: Reforms are Making Prosecutions Easier, NAT'L L.J.,
June 25, 1984, at 26, col. 1).
3. See Lacayo, Sexual Abuse or Abuse of Justice?, TIME, May 11, 1987, at 49.
4. See L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3 ("Sexual intercourse was in-
volved in 55% of the molestations, while 36% of the victims said they had been fondled,
7% confronted by exhibitionists and 1% sodomized.").
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Times poll showed that the majority of abusers are people whom
the children know,' that the victims are just as likely to be white
and middle class as they are to be black and poor,6 and also that
only 3% of the cases ever were reported to the police or other
agency.
7
A recent South Carolina study conducted by the Medical
University of South Carolina Crime Victims Center revealed
that sexual abuse is equally prevalent in this state.' In this
study, funded by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a sam-
ple was taken of 391 women living in Charleston County, South
Carolina." The NIJ researchers found that 33.5% of the women
surveyed had experienced some type of sexual assault before
their eighteenth birthday. 10 Nearly 10% "had been the victim of
a completed child rape."'" This study also showed that the
The Sexual Assault Center in Seattle, Washington categorized the nature of abuse
into the following categories: genital fondling, 57 percent; vaginal intercourse, 33 percent;
oral-genital contact, 27 percent; attempted intercourse, 19 percent; forced masturbation,
12 percent; digital penetration, 10 percent; anal intercourse, 8 percent. D. WHITCOMB,
ASSISTING CHILD VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 33 (1982).
5. See L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 4 ("Abusers include friends and
acquaintances (41%), strangers (27%) and relatives (23%).").
6. See id. at 34, col. 1. ("Contrary to popular opinion, victims are not more likely
to come from lower socioeconomic groups or particular ethnic groups, nor are they any
more susceptible to other kinds of crime.").
Characteristics of child victims reported by the Sexual Assault Center in Seattle,
Washington also support this contention. In 1980 the Center reported that of sexual
child abuse victims, 76% were caucasian, 8% were black, 1% was Spanish-American, 2%
were Native American, 1% was Asian, 2% were classified as "other," and the race of 10%
was unknown. See D. WHITCOMB, supra note 4, at 32. For an opposite viewpoint see L.
PELTON. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 24 (1981) ("There is sub-
stantial evidence of a strong relationship between poverty and child abuse and neglect.").
7. See L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1985, § 1, at 34, col. 1.
8. See Hearings on H.2395 Before the Judiciary Committee, South Carolina
House of Representatives, February 2, 1988 (statement of Benjamin E. Saunders, Ph.D.)
[hereinafter Hearings (testimony)].
9. See id.
10. See id. Additionally the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) re-
ported that in South Carolina in 1986, 2 newborns, 167 children ages 1-4, 372 children
ages 5-9, and 544 children ages 10-14 were victims of sexual abuse. See REPORT To GEN-
ERAL LAWS SuB-COMIMnrEE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICI-
ARY COMMITTEE FROM THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON WOMEN 1 (Feb. 3, 1988).
11. Hearings (testimony), supra note 8. The NIJ researchers did not define "com-
pleted rape." Generally, however, rape is defined as "unlawful sexual intercourse with a
female person without her consent." R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 197 (3d ed.
1982). One may assume that "completed rape" in the NIJ study falls within this general
definition.
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abuser was a stranger to the child in only 14% of the cases.12
Only 5% of the cases were reported to the authorities.
1 3
Several factors illustrate the probability not only that more
cases of sexual abuse are reported every year but that the num-
ber of children who are victims of sexual abuse is increasing.
1 4
More children have working mothers,15 and the number of di-
vorces increases every year.' 6 More children, therefore, are ex-
posed to day-care centers, babysitters, and nurseries. Addition-
ally, one should note that as the number of divorces rises, so
does the likelihood that mothers will remarry, thereby exposing
more children to stepfathers. 17 Finally, studies show that victims
of child abuse have an increased risk that they themselves will
become abusers."s If abused children become abusers and an in-
creasing number of children are victims of sexual abuse, the
number of abusers likely will increase each year.
Although victims of sexual abuse undergo great mental and
physical pain as a result of the abuse, they face perhaps even
greater trauma in the hands of the judicial system.' 9 Sexual
abuse victims may be interviewed dozens of times before they
ever appear in court.20 They tell their stories to parents, doctors,
police officers, social workers, therapists, and also finally to pros-
ecutors.2' One specialist, in fact, believes that these child victims
relive their abuse each time they tell their stories.2
Prosecution of sexual abusers is extremely difficult. First,
there typically are only two witnesses to the alleged abuse - the
child and the abuser.2 Second, the child often has been
threatened that if he discloses the abuse he will be injured, a pet
will be hurt, or his family will no longer love him.24 Third, in
12. Hearings (testimony), supra note 8.
13. See id.
14. See J. CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED 31 (1988).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Stepfathers are more likely to abuse their stepdaughters than are biological fa-
thers. See id.
18. See id. at 32.
19. See id. at 187.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 186-87.
22. See Letter from Sara E. Schuh to South Carolina Representative Tom Huff
(Feb. 11, 1988).
23. See J. CREWDSON, supra note 14, at 162.
24. See id. at 175.
1989]
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most instances little or no corroborating evidence exists, and
generally, the only evidence available consists of medical evi-
dence. 25 Although medical evidence may be available, for exam-
ple when the child has contracted a sexually transmitted disease,
there is no way to link that evidence to a particular perpetrator.
Finally, since children often are afraid to testify, the efficacy of
their testimony is greatly reduced.26
While no rule excludes the testimony of children under a
specific age, young children's competency is often questionable.
Traditionally, courts have examined the child witness's intelli-
gence to determine whether he or she "feels a duty to tell the
truth. ' 27 Nevertheless, children usually are credible witnesses in
abuse cases. Several studies indicate that children rarely fabri-
cate stories of abuse, 28 and commentators also note that a child's
recall is as accurate as an adult's.29
In response to growing awareness and concern about child
sexual abuse victims, many states have enacted legislation
designed both to protect abused children and to increase prose-
cutions and convictions of sex offenders." These methods in-
clude use of anatomically correct dolls,31 exclusion of the public
from trial during the victim's testimony,32 use of one-way mir-
rors during the abused child's trial testimony, 33 as well as crea-
tion of special hearsay exceptions for children's statements of
sexual abuse.
3 4
25. See id. at 161.
26. See Marcotte, Coping With Child Abuse Testimony, 73 A.BA. J. 20 (Dec. 1,
1987).
27. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 62, at 156 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
28. In a Michigan study, 147 children alleging abuse were given polygraph tests,
and only one child was believed to be lying. Likewise, a Denver, Colorado survey found
only 1% of reported claims to be unsubstantiated. See Snyder, Who Tells the Truth
About Sexual Abuse?, 8 CAL. LAWYER 10, 10 (April 1988). Suggestibility, however, may be
related to age. See Saywitz, The Credibility of Child Witnesses, 10 FAMILY ADVOCATE 38,
40 (Winter 1988) ("Children over ten to eleven years old are no more suggestible than
their elders,").
29. See Snyder, supra note 28, at 10. See also Saywitz, supra note 28, at 40
("[C]hildren's memories are not necessarily inferior to adults'.").
30. See Bukley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and
Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DIcK. L. REV. 645, 645
(1985).
31. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-5 (Supp. 1988).
32. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1988).
33. See id. § 12.45.046(2).
34. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
[Vol. 40
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It is arguable that other victims of crime, for example adult
rape victims and relatives witnessing brutal crimes, are in need
of similar protection. This Note, however, will examine only
those statutes that allow for a sexually abused child's testimony
to be introduced at trial either through videotape or closed-cir-
cuit television. Particular attention will be given to South Caro-
lina law and to recent amendments to the South Carolina Code.
These procedures will be analyzed with regard to the United
States Supreme Court's decisions concerning the defendant's
right of confrontation, specifically in light of the Court's recent
decision in Coy v. Iowa.5
II. CHILD PROTECTION PROCEDURES
A. Testimony Through Videotape
Thirty-five states have enacted provisions that permit intro-
duction of a child abuse victim's videotaped testimony at trial.3
The majority of these statutes limit the procedure's application
to children up to a certain age.37 Also, most statutes equate vide-
otaped testimony with testimony given in court. The child vic-
tim, therefore, is not required to testify in the trial of his alleged
460(dd) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1989).
35. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
36. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1988);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (Supp. 1988); ARK STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-86g (Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 92.53 (Harrison Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 22-3433 (Vernon
Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:440.3-5 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West
Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02(3) (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1988); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 491.675-.693 (Vernon Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1987); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 174.227 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN:
§ 30-9-17 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1147 (West 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116
(Supp. 1987); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West Supp. 1988); Wvo.
STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987); VT. R. EVID. 804a (1987 Rules of Evidence).
37. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 92.53(1) (Harrison Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1988).
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abuser." Although the videotape statues share these provisions,
they vary greatly in a number of other respects: (1) the require-
ment that the child be unavailable; (2) the findings that must be
made prior to implementation of a procedure; (3) the require-
ment of face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination; (4)
the procedures that must be utilized when videotaping the
child's testimony.
Some states require that a trial judge deem a child witness
unavailable before a videotaping procedure may be imple-
mented. These jurisdictions include California,3" Colorado,40 In-
diana, 1 South Dakota,4 2 and Texas. 3 For example, the Texas
child protection statute applies only "if the trial court finds that
the child is unavailable to testify at the trial of the offense."
4 4
Conversely, Arizona," Kansas,"4 Kentucky,47 Louisiana,4s Ten-
nessee, 49 and Utah" require that the child must be available to
testify at trial before videotaped testimony may be introduced.
Louisiana's child shield statute states that "[tihe videotape of
an oral statement of the child made before the proceeding be-
gins may be admissible into evidence if. . . [t]he child is availa-
ble to testify."51
The majority of states, however, make no mention of either
availability or unavailability in their child protection statutes.
These states require only that the trial judge find that the child
somehow will be traumatized if required to testify either in open
court or in the defendant's presence.52
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp.
1988); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989).
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989).
40. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986).
41. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Supp. 1988).
42. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1988).
43. See TEx. CODE CR1AM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
44. See id. art. 38.071, § 1.
45. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (Supp. 1988).
46. See KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 22-3433 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
47. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
48. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:440.3-.5 (West Supp. 1989).
49. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7,116 (Supp. 1987).
50. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1989).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:440.5(8) (West Supp. 1989).
52. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046(a)(5) (Supp. 1988) (court must consider "the
mental or emotional strain that will be caused by requiring the child to testify"); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(l) (West. Supp. 1988) (hearsay admissible if "the court
[Vol. 40
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The various pieces of state legislation also differ in a second
respect - the findings that must be made prior to actual use of
a videotaping procedure. Surprisingly, a number of states do not
require the trial court to make any findings, either specific or
general, that the child victim is in need of special protection.5
In these jurisdictions videotaping procedures may be used if the
prosecution and/or the child make such a request. Montana, for
example, provides that videotaped testimony may be taken and
introduced at trial "at the request of such victim and with the
concurrence of the prosecuting attorney."54 Similarly, California
allows such a procedure to be implemented upon application by
the prosecuting attorney. 5
On the other hand, a trial court's finding that a child is
likely to be traumatized by testifying is required by some state
statutes." Most of these statutes, however, give little guidance
to the trial court that is required to assess the child's mental
and emotional well-being.57 Colorado, one of the rare states to
provide this direction, requires the judge to consider, at a mini-
mum, testimony from a child therapist or other person.5
Another variance among the statutes is the requirement of
face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination. The statutes
differ on whether they require the testifying child to come eye-
to-eye with his alleged abuser. Most states require the defendant
to be present when a child's testimony is taken by videotape.5
Many of these states, however, do provide protection for the
child while his testimony is given by shielding him from either
finds that the mental or physical well-being ... will more likely than not be harmed").
53. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203
(1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns
Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TEx. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1987).
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989).
56. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(3) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West
Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (West Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
967.04(7)(b) (Supp. 1988).
57. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (West Supp. 1988).
58. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(3) (1986) ("[S]uch finding shall be based on,
but not limited to, recommendations from the child's therapist or any other person hav-
ing direct contact with the child.").
59. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1988).
1989]
7
Holmes: "Lights, Camera, Action": Videotaping and Closed-Circuit Televisi
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
seeing or hearing the defendant. Methods of shielding include
use of two-way mirrors where the defendant can see and hear
the child but the child cannot see or hear the defendant.60 An-
other method is confinement of the defendant to another room
that is linked electronically to the room where the child testi-
fies1.6 At least nine states require the child to come face-to-face
with the defendant.6 2 The child is not protected during the ac-
tual videotaping from confronting his alleged attacker, but is
spared the trauma of testifying in open court.
Most states provide for cross-examination at the time the
videotape is made. 3 Of the handful of states that do not provide
for cross-examination at this time, the majority of these jurisdic-
tions require the child's availability at trial. 4
The methods that must be utilized when videotaping a
child's testimony also vary greatly. Some state statutes are silent
about the actual procedures to be implemented and provide only
that the judge, child, prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel
be present at the taping. 5 Others specify that this taping should
take place in the judge's chambers. 6 Still other statutes allow
people such as parents and relatives to accompany the child
when the testimony is recorded,67 perhaps to bolster the child's
confidence. Arizona, Kentucky, and Texas, in an even greater ef-
fort to protect the child victim, have enacted legislation that ad-
ditionally requires equipment operators to be shielded from the
60. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(4) (Harrison Supp. 1988).
61. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(A)(2) (Anderson 1987).
62. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1988);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 417:13-a (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1988).
63. See supra note 59.
64. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:440.5 (West Supp. 1989).
65. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413
(1986).
66. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3(a) (Supp. 1988) ("[T]he testimony shall be taken
outside the courtroom in the judge's chambers."); ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (Supp.
1988) ("IT]he court may order all questioning of a minor witness to be videotaped in the
judge's chambers.").
67, See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 40
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child's view. 8
B. Testimony Via Closed-Circuit Television
Approximately twenty-two states have adopted protective
legislation that permits closed-circuit television to be used to
convey a child's testimony to the jury69 The statutes providing
for this method of testimony are strikingly similar to those that
allow a child victim's testimony to be videotaped. These statutes
also place an age limit on their applicability."0
Under many closed-circuit statutes, the defendant is con-
fined to the courtroom while the child, the prosecution, and the
judge retire to another room to take testimony.71 These statutes
provide greater protection to children than do provisions for
videotaped depositions. For example, the majority of these stat-
utes require equipment operators to be confined to another area
or behind a screen while the child testifies.72
As under statutory videotaping provisions, the majority of
statutes that provide for closed-circuit television require the
trial judge to find that a child would be traumatized before the
procedure may be implemented. The degree of harm to the child
varies from state to state.7 3 Again, a few states require that the
68. See supra note 67.
69. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1988);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (Harrison Supp. 1988);
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 22-3434
(Vernon Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
102 (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 65.10 (McKinney Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1148 (West 1987); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1989); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
35-15.5 (Supp. 1989); VT. R. EVID. 804a (1987 Rules of Evidence).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988) ("[T]he court may ... order the
taking of a videotaped deposition of an alleged victim ... who is under the age of 16.");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (Harrison Supp. 1988) (court may order closed-circuit television
to be used if victim is under 16).
71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (Harrison Supp. 1988).
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp.
1988); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2(a) (Supp. 1988) ("[T]he court shall consider the
age and maturity of the child, the nature of the offense, the nature of the testimony that
may be expected, and the possible effect that such testimony in person at trial may have
1989]
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trial judge find the child unavailable before the protections of
the statute may be implemented.74 Even so, these jurisdictions
are less likely to require a finding of unavailability for the utili-
zation of closed-circuit television than they are for the use of
videotaped depositions because the child is present at the court-
house during pendency of the trial.
Finally, most of these statutes set forth detailed procedures
for presenting a child abuse victim's testimony. As noted above,
the majority list the individuals permitted to be present while
the child testifies.7 5 A few jurisdictions allow the presence of
"any person [who] . . . would contribute to the welfare and well-
being of the child. ' 76 Often, camera operators are removed from
the child's view.7
C. South Carolina's Effort
On June 3, 1988, South Carolina, by amending sections 19-
1-18071 and 19-11-2571 of the South Carolina Code, 0 joined those
states that have enacted legislation designed to protect the sex-
ual child abuse victim. The South Carolina amendments re-
on the victim or witness, along with any other relevant matters."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
37-13.2 (Supp. 1988) (child must be found "unable to testify before the court without
suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm").
74. See, e.g., Tax. CODE CraM. PROc. ANN. art. 38.071, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
This statute does not define unavailability but merely states that videotaping will be
used "if the trial court finds that the child is unavailable." Id.
75. See, e.g., id. art. 38.071, § 3 (allowing only the judge, attorneys, equipment op-
erators, and "any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being
of the child").
76. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988).
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
79. Id. § 19-11-25.
80. South Carolina previously adopted the Victims and Witness's Bill of Rights,
which provided:
VICTIMS AND WITNESSES WHO ARE VERY YOUNG, ELDERLY, WHO
ARE HANDICAPPED OR WHO HAVE SPECIAL NEEDS, HAVE A RIGHT
TO SPECIAL RECOGNITION AND ATTENTION BY ALL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES.
The court shall treat "special" witnesses sensitively, using closed or taped ses-
sions when appropriate. The solicitor or defense shall notify the court when a
victim or witness deserves special consideration.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1976). This section has been applied when
videotaping the statement of a victim of sexual child abuse. See State v. Cooper, 291 S.C.
351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
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sulted from both an increased awareness of the problems of sex-
ual child abuse and an increased pressure from various South
Carolina solicitors' offices."' The South Carolina Supreme
Court's opinion in State v. Hudnall"2 also may have helped trig-
ger this legislative enactment. In Hudnall the court, in reversing
the defendant-father's conviction, held that a three-year-old
child's testimony was inadmissible in her father's trial for crimi-
nal sexual misconduct. The court determined that the child was
incompetent because she "could not be held morally accountable
for telling a lie."
83
Sections two and three of South Carolina Code section 19-
11-25 s4 were amended on June 3, 1988. These amendments cre-
ate a rebuttable presumption of a child's competency and pro-
vide for notice if a videotaped deposition is requested. These
sections are beyond the scope of this Note and, therefore, will
not be discussed.
Section 19-1-18085 was amended to allow particular out-of-
court statements made by a child victim to be admissible in cer-
tain family court proceedings. 6 Like the majority of statutes
that have provided for either videotaping or closed-circuit televi-
sion,8 7 this new South Carolina amendment places an age limit
on the provisions of section 19-1-180. The statute is available
only to introduce statements made by children under age
twelve.88
Section 19-1-180(B)(1) provides that a child's statement is
admissible in court in three instances: (1) if the child testifies in
court; (2) if the child testifies through an out-of-court video-
taped deposition; or (3) if the child testifies via closed-circuit
81. Various solicitor's offices supported House Bill 2395, which was later enacted as
the amendment to South Carolina Code Sections 19-1-180 and 19-11-25, at a public
hearing held by the South Carolina House Judiciary Committee on February 3, 1988.
82. 293 S.C. 97, 359 S.E.2d 59 (1987).
83. Id. at 99, 359 S.E.2d at 61.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-25 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
85. Id. § 19-1-180.
86. Section 19-1-180 states that it applies to "family court proceeding[s] brought
pursuant to Section 20-7-610 or Section 20-7-736." Id. Section 20-7-610 applies to abuse
and neglect proceedings. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7 610 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 20-
7-736 confers jurisdiction upon the family court in abuse proceedings. See id. § 20-7-736.
87. See supra notes 36 and 69.
88. Section 19-1-180(A) applies to "an out-of-court statement made by a child
under twelve years of age." S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (em-
phasis added).
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television." The statute does not require the trial judge to find
the child unavailable to testify prior to admitting these hearsay
statements in court. Moreover, the court is not required to make
any findings, either general or particular, that the child will be
traumatized if required to take the stand at the proceeding. Sec-
tion 19-1-180(B)(1)90 does not specify the methods that must be
applied during taping or presentation of the child's testimony.
These new amendments also leave open questions regarding
whether the defendant must be present or may be excluded. The
only condition to admission of these statements is that the child
be subject to cross-examination at the time that they are made."
The remainder of section 19-1-180 provides that other hear-
say statements may be admitted either if the child is found to be
unavailable 2 or if the child's statement is shown to "possess
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 3 This section is
replete with factors the trial judge may consider in determining
both the child's unavailability94 and whether a statement is, in
fact, trustworthy. In determining the trustworthiness of a state-
ment, the court may consider, inter alia, the child's knowledge,
age, motive, and distress as well as the statement's verity and
the credibility of the person relating the statement.", These fac-
tors, however, do not appear applicable to the previous provi-
sions allowing the introduction of testimony through videotaped
deposition or closed-circuit television.
III. THE CONFRONTATION
Although the numerous state statutes on videotaping and
89. The subsection reads:
(B) An out-of-court statement may be admitted as provided in subsection (A)
if.
(1) the child testifies at the proceeding or testifies by means of videotaped
deposition or closed-circuit television ....
Id. § 19-1.180(B)(1).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. § 19-1-80(B)(2)(a).
93. Id. § 19-1-180(B)(2)(b).
94. A child may be found unavailable if he is dead or disabled, if a privilege exists,
if he cannot communicate because of fear, or if there is a substantial likelihood that he
would be traumatized. See id. § 19-1-180(B)(2)(a)i-v.
95. See id. § 19-1-180(D)(1)-(10).
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closed-circuit television may reduce trauma to child victims,
these statutes could face constitutional challenge. The defend-
ant's sixth amendment right of confrontation is a major stum-
bling block to implementation of these procedures.
A. The Supreme Court Decisions
As early as 1600, English common law provided that an ac-
cused had a right to confront and cross-examine his accusers. 8
This common-law rule was incorporated into the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, which provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him. '9 7 The right of confron-
tation long has been recognized as a fundamental right in the
United States9 and crucial to ensuring the veracity of wit-
nesses." This right, in fact, was an issue in one of the few
United States Supreme Court decisions to hold a congressional
act unconstitutional. In Kirby v. United States'00 the Court de-
clared that an 1875 statute violated the sixth amendment. That
statute provided that a previous conviction against a person for
stealing property "shall be conclusive evidence in the prosecu-
tion against such receiver that the property . . . has been em-
bezzled, stolen or purloined."''1 The Court noted that a defend-
ant would have no connection with the previous trial and,
therefore, no opportunity to confront crucial witnesses.0 2
96. See D. FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 94 (1976).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
98. The right of confrontation is "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and
liberty ... long deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is
guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the constitution of the
United States and in the constitutions of most if not all the states composing the
Union." Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
99. A defendant's confrontation of his accusers
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath - thus im-
pressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by
the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to
cross-examination, the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth'; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in as-
sessing his credibility.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote omitted).
100. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
101. Id. at 48.
102. See id. at 61.
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The majority of Supreme Court decisions concerning the
confrontation clause consider the question of which types of
hearsay are admissible in a criminal proceeding without violat-
ing the defendant's right of confrontation. Hearsay is defined as
"a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 1 0 3 The Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize twenty-nine exceptions to the rule that makes hearsay
evidence inadmissible. 04 These exceptions are based on the no-
tion that they are inherently reliable or that the declarant is
unavailable.'0 3
Prior to 1965, the Supreme Court did little to delineate the
line between hearsay and the right of confrontation. In early
confrontation decisions, the Court held that testimony used in a
preliminary hearing was admissible if the defendant was respon-
sible for the witness's absence, 06 that dying declarations were
admissible,0 7 and that testimony from a prior trial was admissi-
ble if the testifying witness was deceased. 08
Although the Supreme Court has since stated that it would
be error to assume that "the Confrontation Clause is nothing
more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay,"'' 09 its
early decisions seemed to equate the values of the confrontation
clause with those of the hearsay rules.
In 1965 the Supreme Court deliberately set out to delineate
the boundaries of a criminal defendant's right of confrontation.
Pointer v. Texas'" involved a trial judge's decision to admit
damaging testimony taken at a preliminary hearing. Although
Pointer had been present at the hearing, he did not cross-ex-
amine the witness who gave this controversial testimony because
he did not have an attorney. In Pointer the Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of whether the confrontation clause applied
to the states through the fourteenth amendment and concluded
103. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
104. See id. 803, 804.
105. See I. YOUNGER, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION (audio-cassette tape, Condyre/
Trans-Media Distrib. Corp. 1978).
106. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
107. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
108. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
109. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
110. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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that it did."1 After answering this threshold question, the Court
further held that Pointer's right of confrontation had been vio-
lated." 2 Although the Court did not define a defendant's right of
confrontation, it interestingly equated that right with the right
of cross-examination: "As has been pointed out, a major reason
underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a de-
fendant charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him."
'"1 3
In Douglas v. Alabama,"4 decided on the same day as
Pointer, the Supreme Court again determined that the right of
cross-examination is the essential element of the confrontation
right. The Court stated that the "inability to cross examine...
as to the alleged confession plainly denied [the defendant] the
right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation
Clause.""1
5
These two cases seem to stand for the proposition that what
the confrontation clause guarantees is the right of cross-exami-
nation. Additional proof was supplied by the Court in Bruton v.
United States."6 In Bruton the Court held that a confession by
one defendant in a joint trial violated the confrontation clause
because the other defendant was precluded from cross-examin-
ing the co-defendant who did not take the stand."
7
The Supreme Court affirmatively stated this proposition in
California v. Green."8 In Green the Court seemed to have aban-
doned the notion that the rules of hearsay and the rights con-
ferred upon the defendant by the confrontation clause are
designed to protect identical values.1'9 Green involved a wit-
ness's testimony at the defendant's preliminary hearing that in-
dicated that the defendant was a drug supplier. Later at trial,
the prosecution introduced this testimony to refresh the wit-
111. Resolution of this issue was a foregone conclusion since Justice Hugo Black had
authored the opinion in Pointer. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting) (advocating the doctrine of total incorporation).
112. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406.
113. Id. at 406-07.
114. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
115. Id. at 419.
116. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
117. See id. at 126.
118. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
119. See id. at 155.
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ness's recollection. 120 In a convoluted opinion, the Supreme
Court upheld the introduction of this previous testimony despite
the defendant's contention that his right of confrontation had
been violated. The Court noted that the witness had been cross-
examined at length at the preliminary hearing.1 2' The Court re-
iterated its prior rule that the right of confrontation is essen-
tially the right of cross-examination: "There is good reason to
conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admit-
ting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declar-
ant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective
cross-examination.'' 22 Green suggests that this cross-examina-
tion is effective if implemented either at trial or when the state-
ment is made.
123
Similarly, in Dutton v. Evans 24 the Supreme Court faced a
right of confrontation issue. In Dutton the trial court admitted
the testimony of a witness who stated that a co-conspirator,
upon returning from his arraignment, had stated that "[i]f it
hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now.' 1 25 Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, stated that "[ilt seems apparent that the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule
stem from the same roots.'1 26 The Court focused on the defend-
ant's ability to cross-examine this witness and the fact that
nineteen other witnesses had testified for the prosecution. The
Court ruled that Evans' right of confrontation had not been vio-
lated. The Court once again emphasized that the purpose of the
confrontation clause is cross-examination.
127
120. The witness claimed at trial that he did not remember the events because he
was on "acid" at the time the alleged drug exchange took place. See id. at 152. The
witness's recollection was not refreshed and therefore he was technically unavailable.
121. See id. at 165.
122. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
123. See . YOUNGER, supra note 105.
124. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
125. Id. at 77.
126. Id. at 86.
127. See id. at 88-89. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), in which the
Supreme Court held that the defendant's confrontation right was violated because he
was prohibited from cross-examining a key witness about his juvenile record. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that "[c]ross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested."
Id. at 316.
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Finally, Ohio v. Roberts,128 one of the Supreme Court's later
decisions on confrontation, involved the introduction at trial of
testimony taken during a preliminary hearing. In Roberts the
witness was unavailable to testify at trial. The Supreme Court,
focusing on opportunity to cross-examine the witness, ruled that
the defendant's right of confrontation had not been violated. 129
The Court, however, went beyond simply finding that the de-
fendant, at some time, had cross-examined his accusers.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, stated that the
confrontation clause restricts admissible hearsay in two ways.
First, the court stated that the rule of necessity requires the
prosecution to "produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of,
the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the de-
fendant."' 0 Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable,
the "[c]lause countenances only hearsay marked with such trust-
worthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason
of the general rule.' ,,1s' In other words, if a showing is made
that the witness is unavailable for cross-examination, the hear-
say statement will be admissible "only if it bears adequate 'indi-
cia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case when the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.'
32
B. The State Court Decisions
Although the Court has stated that the confrontation clause
"reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,
the central thrust of pre-Coy Supreme Court decisions was that
the confrontation clause primarily guaranteed the right to cross-
examine witnesses. Some state court decisions prior to Coy ap-
plied this premise in addressing the introduction of testimony
through videotaping or closed-circuit television. For example, in
128. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
129. See id. at 70.
130. Id. at 65.
131. Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 109 (1934)).
132. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 63.
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State v. Cooper134 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
introduction of videotaped testimony of a three-year-old child
did not violate the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him. In Cooper the trial judge, after speaking to both the
victim and her mother, determined that the child would be trau-
matized if required to testify in open court. The trial court al-
lowed the use of a videotaping procedure from which the de-
fendant was precluded. Subsequently, the solicitor
recommended, and the trial court approved, introduction of the
videotape at trial. Cooper appealed, claiming that his right of
confrontation had been violated. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina affirmed Cooper's conviction, holding that the face-to-
face provision "does not require . . . direct physical confronta-
tion between defendant and witness [but] . . .may be served by
...cross-examination.' ' 35 Other courts similarly have resolved
such constitutional challenges.'36
Other pre-Coy tribunals have rejected this reasoning. These
courts adhered to literal interpretation of the right of confronta-
tion and concluded that the sixth amendment's confrontation
provision requires face-to-face, eye-to-eye confrontation.3 7
IV. Coy v. Iowa
The United States Supreme Court addressed this split of
opinion and in so doing marked a drastic change from its previ-
ous decisions in the confrontation arena. In Coy v. Iowa' 8 the
Supreme Court held that the use at trial of a semi-opaque
screen placed between child witnesses and a defendant accused
134. 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
135. Id. at 356, 353 S.E.2d at 454.
136. See People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. App. 3d 640, 497 N.E.2d 308 (1986) (upheld use
of videotape to introduce five-year-old child's testimony); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716
S.Wo2d 224 (Ky. 1986) (upheld use of television cameras to introduce testimony of child
abuse victim); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(upheld use of a ten-year-old child's videotaped testimony); Commonwealth v. Ludwig,
366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987) (upheld introduction of six-year-old's testimony
through closed-circuit television).
137. See Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981)
(defendant and child witness were seated so that they could not look at each other);
Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987) (victim permitted to testify via
closed-circuit television); State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542 (1899) (defendant's
right was violated because child rape victim was seated with back to defendant).
138. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
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of abusing them violated the defendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation.
In August 1985, two thirteen-year-old girls who were camp-
ing out in a make-shift tent in a suburban backyard were awak-
ened by a man in the middle of the night. Their assailant, who
wore either makeup or a mask to hide his identity, shone a flash-
,light in the girls' eyes so that they could not identify him. The
assailant demanded that the girls undress, fondled them, and
forced them "to kiss each other and pretend that they were en-
joying it."' 3 Approximately one and a half hours later, the at-
tacker disappeared.
140
One victim's father suspected that John Avery Coy had
been the girls' abuser. He had seen Coy, who lived next door to
where the girls had camped out, watching as they had set up
their tent.'4 ' The father reported his suspicions to the police,
who subsequently arrested Coy.
On August 14, 1985, Coy was charged with two counts of
lascivious acts with a child. 42 On November 6, 1985, just seven
days prior to Coy's trial, the State moved to have the girls tes-
tify via closed-circuit television or to have Coy placed behind a
screen, thereby preventing the girls from viewing him.'43 Coy ob-
jected to use of the screen, claiming that it violated his right to
due process and his sixth amendment confrontation right. Coy
claimed that the screen violated his due process rights because
the procedure made him appear guilty, vitiating the presump-
tion of innocence. 144 Coy also claimed that his right of confron-
tation was violated because the screen prevented face-to-face
confrontation between him and the witnesses testifying against
him.
145
The trial court ruled that a one-way screen be placed in the
courtroom; the screen allowed the defendant to watch the wit-
139. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 1.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1-2.
142. See Brief of Appellant at 3.
143. See id. This motion was made pursuant to IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.3 (West
Supp. 1988).
144. The courtroom lights had to be turned off, and "a panel of bright lights had to
be focused directly on" the screen for the device to work. Brief of Appellant at 6-7. In
fact the trial judge noted "the thing does cause sort of a dramatic emphasis, but we'll
have to instruct on it if we grant the motion." Id. at 6.
145. See id. at 4.
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nesses, but prevented the witnesses from viewing him. The trial
judge did not consider any evidence that the girls would be trau-
matized by testifying in open court. On appeal the Iowa Su-
preme Court affirmed Coy's conviction, holding that Coy could
cross-examine the two child-witnesses. 14 The court stated that
"[confrontation] cannot be had except by the direct and per-
sonal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. "147
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, who was joined by
five other Justices, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of
the Iowa Supreme Court. Initially, the Court noted that the
right of confrontation existed in early Roman law.148 The Court
then rejected the State's contention that Coy's cross-examina-
tion of the child witnesses had not been impaired and that Coy's
right of confrontation, therefore, was not violated. 14 The Court
clearly declared that a defendant's sixth amendment right re-
quires more than the right of cross-examination. 50 The confron-
tation clause, according to the Court, requires eye-to-eye con-
frontation.' 5' Justice Scalia quoted Shakespeare, 52 the New
Testament, 5 3 as well as a 1953 speech made by President Eisen-
hower to the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League'54 to illus-
trate the confrontation clause's historical requirement of a face-
146. See State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
147. See id. at 733 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986)).
148. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
149. See id. at 2802-03.
150. See id. at 2802 ("The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has
persisted over the centuries because there is much truth in it. . . . [Tihe right to face-to-
face confrontation serves much the same purpose as a less explicit component of the
Confrontation Clause . . . - the right to cross-examine the accuser.").
151. The Court stated, "We have never doubted.., that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses." Id. at 2800 (em-
phasis added).
152. See id. ("Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation
when he had Richard the Second say: 'Then call them to our presence - face to face,
and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely
speak.'" (quoting Richard II, Act 1, Scene 1)).
153. See id. (" 'It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die
before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to
defend himself against the charges.' ") (quoting Acts 25:16).
154. See id. at 2801. ("[Eisenhower] said, it was necessary to '[m]eet anyone face to
face with whom you disagree. . . . In this country if someone dislikes you, or accuses
you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow.' ") (citing press re-
lease quoted in Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J.
PuB. L. 381, 381 (1959)).
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to-face meeting.
Scalia turned next to the State's second argument that the
defendant's right of confrontation was outweighed by a need to
protect child victims from abuse. He initially noted that the
right of confrontation is not absolute but "may give way to other
important interests."' 55 He stated, however, that
[t]o hold that our determination of what implications are rea-
sonable must take into account other important interests is not
the same as holding that we can identify exceptions, in light of
other important interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of
the clause: "a right to meet face to face all those who appear
and give evidence at trial." 156
Scalia left open the possibility of exceptions, but stated that
such exceptions would be allowed only if "necessary to further
an important public policy.'
57
The Court rejected the notion that the Iowa statute's pre-
sumption of trauma to the child witness could provide the ne-
cessity.'58 The Court indicated that individualized findings that
a particular witness needs protection would be necessary; since
there had been only generalized findings in this case, the major-
ity concluded that Coy's conviction "could not be sustained by
any conceivable exception."' 59 The case was remanded to the
Iowa Supreme Court to determine whether denial of Coy's right
of confrontation was harmless error.
160
Justice O'Connor, who joined in the majority's opinion,
wrote a separate opinion,1"' which is important because it gives
the states some indication how to avoid creating constitutionally
infirm child protection statues. Scalia's majority opinion made
no mention of O'Connor's concurrence, but specifically rebutted
points found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun and
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
O'Connor wrote to stress her view that the right of face-to-
155. 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
156. Id. at 2803 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (emphasis in
original)).
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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face confrontation is not absolute and may "permit the use of
certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness."'62
O'Connor, joined by Justice White, recognized the problems of
child abuse and the efforts made by various states to protect
child abuse victims. The point of O'Connor's concurrence was
"to make clear that nothing in today's decision necessarily
dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child wit-
nesses." '163 O'Connor also stressed that even if a particular statue
violated the confrontation clause, it might fall under an excep-
tion and its use, therefore, might be permitted.6 The concur-
rence finally suggested that many state statutes designed to pro-
tect child witnesses will not run afoul of the confrontation clause
so long as the trial courts utilize a case-by-case analysis to deter-
mine whether the statute's protection is necessary.6 5
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented.' 6 Blackmun believed that Coy's conviction should be af-
firmed because his sole objection was that the witnesses could
not see him while they testified. Supreme Court precedent,
Blackmun argued, did not support such an objection. 67 The dis-
sent further opined that even if such an objection were plausi-
ble, a defendant's right to be seen by witnesses would be out-
weighed by a "sufficiently significant state interest."'68
Additionally, Blackmun noted that the majority's requirement
of particularized findings was flawed. In support he pointed to
other accepted exceptions to the confrontation clause, such as
excited utterances and business records, which do not require a
"case-specific inquiry"169
In December 1988 on remand from the Supreme Court, the
Iowa Supreme Court determined that violation of Coy's right to
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2804.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 2805.
166. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 2806-07.
168. Id. at 2808.
169. Id. at 2809 n.6. These exceptions to the hearsay rules, along with the other
twenty-seven exceptions recognized by the Federal Rules of Evidence, are based on the
notion of inherent reliability. For example, a dying declaration is inherently reliable be-
cause the person uttering the declaration is unlikely to lie in the face of "the beating of
the wings of the dark angel." I. YOUNGER, supra note 105.
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confront his accusers was not harmless error. 170 The Iowa court
noted that the only direct evidence against Coy was the girl's
testimony, which had been stricken; the remaining circumstan-
tial evidence did not establish Coy's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court, therefore, reversed Coy's conviction and re-
manded the case for a new trial.17 The children that the court
had attempted to protect will now be subjected to another
proceeding.
V. THE POsT-Coy DECISIONS
A. State Court Opinions
In the months following the Supreme Court's decision in
Coy, various state courts have been faced with the question that
the Coy majority "[left] for another day": 72 whether any excep-
tions to the requirement of face-to-face confrontation at trial, in
fact, do exist. The majority opinion in Coy clearly states that the
right of confrontation is something more than the right to cross-
examine witnesses. 73 At the very core of the right of confronta-
tion is the defendant's right to come face-to-face with the wit-
nesses against him.174 Scalia's brief opinion does not clearly state
whether a defendant must come face-to-face with these wit-
nesses at trial or whether such an encounter at some other time
would suffice. Based upon reasoning in the Supreme Court's
prior confrontation opinions, particularly California v. Green,175
face-to-face confrontation satisfies the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right if it occurs either at trial or when the testimony is
given.
171
Scalia's opinion in Coy arguably indicates that this right of
face-to-face confrontation applies if a witness testifies in the
courtroom and not if a witness testifies at any other time.
77
170. See State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa 1988).
171. See id.
172. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
173. See id. at 2802.
174. See id.
175. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
176. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
177. Scalia stated that "it confers at least 'a right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial.'" 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988) (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). Scalia fur-
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Scalia likely did not intend to preclude the defendant from com-
ing face-to-face with witnesses whose testimony is introduced at
trial through alternate methods. The defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights are implicated regardless of whether his accusers
testify on the stand or through a videotaped deposition.
What seems striking about the post-Coy decisions is their
almost universal determination that such exceptions to the right
of confrontation do exist. In the clear majority of post-Coy state
court opinions, the courts either upheld use of a witness protec-
tion procedure or held that the defendant's confrontation right
was violated because the trial judge failed to make particularized
findings of necessity.
1
7
8
Craig v. State,17 9 decided by the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals less than two months after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Coy, often is cited in post-Coy opinions. 180 The appellant,
Sandra Ann Craig, who owned a kindergarten and preschool,
was accused of sexually abusing several children who attended
the school.18 l On appeal, the Maryland court rejected Craig's
contention that her constitutional right of confrontation had
been violated because several children had been permitted to
testify through closed-circuit television.182 The Craig court ap-
plied Coy and extrapolated three rules from the majority opin-
ion in Coy: (1) the face-to-face requirement is not absolute; (2)
exceptions to this requirement were not precluded; and (3) if
Scalia's opinion ruled out the use of closed-circuit television, his
opinion was not shared by a majority of the Court.8 3
Applying these three rules and focusing on both Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion and state precedent,'8 the Craig
ther added, "We have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guaran-
tees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact." Id. (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. granted,
No. 89SC25 (Colo. March 13, 1989) (LEXIS, States Library, Colo. file) (en banc).
179. 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. granted, 314 Md.
458, 550 A.2d 1168 (1988).
180. See Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324; State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765 P.2d 1183 (Ct.
App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1572 (1989); State v. Logan, 141 Misc. 2d 790, 535
N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
181. See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 254, 544 A.2d at 786.
182. See id. at 280-84, 544 A.2d at 799-800. This procedure was implemented pursu-
ant to a Maryland statute. See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988).
183. See 76 Md. App. at 280, 544 A.2d at 798.
184. The court relied in part on Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275
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court first determined that there are exceptions to the confron-
tation clause's requirement of face-to-face confrontation.' Cit-
ing Ohio v. Roberts86 and United States v. Inadi,'s' the court
noted that exceptions, "in particular the use of extra-judicial
declarations based on a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule"' l 5s previously had been permitted. The court concluded
that if Coy dictated that the face-to-face requirement was abso-
lute, then it would have overruled Roberts, Inadi, and all other
decisions allowing the use of extra-judicial declarations at
trial. 89
Having concluded that the confrontation clause's eye-to-eye
requirement does admit exceptions, the Craig court next deter-
mined that procedures may be implemented to prevent a child
abuse witness from gazing upon a defendant or from testifying
in his presence if such a witness would be traumatized if forced
to testify in court. 190 The court additionally rejected Craig's con-
tention that Maryland's closed-circuit statute' 91 was an uncon-
stitutional violation of the right of confrontation, holding that if
the law were properly implemented, a defendant's sixth amend-
ment right would not be violated. 92 The Craig bench stated that
Maryland's prior decision, Wildermuth v. State,193 prescribed
the manner in which the statute must be implemented - by
showing a witness's unavailability as well as showing that the
statement bears adequate indicia of reliability.' The court fi-
nally noted that key to the statute's implementation is a finding
that a child cannot testify because of trauma and thus would be
unable to "reasonably communicate.'
' 95
The majority of other post-Coy decisions have interpreted
(1987), in which the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed several issues related to § 9-
102 of the Maryland Code.
185. See 76 Md. App. at 280-81, 544 A.2d at 799.
186. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
187. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
188. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 281, 544 A.2d at 799.
189. See id. at 281-82, 544 A.2d at 799.
190. See id. at 280-81, 544 A.2d at 790.
191. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1988).
192. See 76 Md. App. at 282-83, 544 A.2d at 800.
193. 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987). The Wildermuth court rejected the defend-
ants contention that the procedure prescribed by statute contravened his right of
confrontation.
194. See Craig, 76 Md. App. at 282-83, 544 A.2d at 800.
195. Id. at 283, 544 A.2d at 800.
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Coy similarly, holding that exceptions to Coy's face-to-face re-
quirement do exist and that the states may adopt procedures to
avoid requiring a child sexual abuse victim to testify in court.
For example, the Louisiana Court of Appeals stated that these
exceptions may not be created judicially but must "be created
by a statute designed to procedurally accommodate the compet-
ing interests.'1
9 6
Introduction of a three-year-old child's videotaped deposi-
tion was upheld in Strickland v. State,9 7 in which the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals weighed public policy against the
right of confrontation. It concluded that protection of child vic-
tims from trauma, which reduced emotional and mental harm to
the child, as well as the reliability of testimony outweighed the
right of confrontation in child abuse cases.9's The court con-
cluded that the defendant's right of confrontation had not been
violated, since the defendant had been given full opportunity to
cross-examine the child during her deposition, which was taken
pursuant to an Alabama statute.'
Introduction of a videotaped deposition also has been up-
held even when the defendant's presence was precluded. In a re-
cent opinion, Glendening v. State,20 0 the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida upheld use of a three-year-old girl's videotaped deposition
against her father's contention that it violated his right to con-
front his accusers. 20 1 The procedure adopted in the former dif-
fers from that in Strickland because the defendant in Glenden-
ing was confined behind a two-way mirror.202
Introduction of a child's testimony through closed-circuit
television similarly has been upheld against constitutional at-
tack. For example, in State v. Rivera20 3 a New York court up-
196. State v. Roberts, 533 So. 2d 1071 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
197. No. 2 Div. 575 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, States Library, Ala.
file).
198. See id.
199. ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1988) ("[S]uch deposition shall be taken before
... the defendant and his attorney .... Examination and cross-examination of the al-
leged victim or witness shall proceed at the taking of the videotaped deposition as
though the alleged victim or witness were testifying personally in the trial of the case.").
200, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988).
201. See id. at 217-19.
202. The Glendening court consistently referred to the mirror as two-way; it noted,
however, that the child was not able to see her father as she testified. See id. at 218.
203. 141 Misc. 2d 1031, 535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
[Vol. 40
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss3/6
VIDEOTAPING AND THE 6TH AMENDMENT
held the use of "a 'two-way' television system,"20 4 noting that it
was "effectively used. '20 5 The court also stated that "the child
witness was able to testify outside of the presence of the defend-
ant while being able to view him on the screen before her.
'20 6
Likewise, in State v. Logan20 7 another New York court upheld
the introduction of testimony presented through closed-circuit
television. The Superior Court of New Jersey also has held that
testimony presented through this medium does not violate the
face-to-face requirement of the sixth amendment's confrontation
clause.20 s In that case, the court stated, "We cannot say that the
New Jersey statute .. .falls within the absolute strictures of
Coy v. Iowa.
''20 1
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The various state courts that have upheld introduction of
videotaping and closed-circuit television have relied primarily on
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy. Although Scalia
did not specifically hold that implementation of these tech-
niques would be unconstitutional, a majority of the Court clearly
believed that introduction of testimony through alternate proce-
dures would be permitted only in exceptional circumstances to
"further an important public policy. '210 Legislatures considering
enactment of provisions that provide for videotaping or closed-
circuit television should carefully balance the defendant's consti-
tutional right of confrontation against society's desire to protect
sexual abuse victims. At a minimum, a number of protections
should be incorporated into legislation to protect the defend-
ant's rights and to advance society's desire to protect the victims
of abuse.
A. The Judge's Findings
The first of these recommendations is that the trial judge
204. Id. at -, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 141 Misc. 2d 790, 535 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
208. See State v. Davis, 229 N.J. Super. 66, 550 A.2d 1241 (Ct. App. Div. 1988).
209. Id. at 75, 550 A.2d at 1245.
210. 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
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make individualized findings that the child victim in a particular
case would be traumatized if required to testify at trial. The ma-
jority in Coy clearly stated that such particularized findings are
necessary.2 ' O'Connor further declared that exceptions to the
face-to-face requirement may exist, but stressed the need for
"case-specific finding[s] of necessity."2 2
In the post-Coy era, state courts correctly have interpreted
Coy as requiring particularized findings. For example, in those
cases that have held that introduction of a child's testimony vio-
lated the defendant's right of confrontation, the focus has not
been on the notion that the confrontation clause prohibits ex-
ceptions. Rather, these cases have set forth the rule that excep-
tions will be permissible if the trial court makes certain findings
about that particular child witness. Findings concerning children
in general have been found insufficient: "[A] court . . . must
make particularized findings concerning the unavailability of the
individual child-witness involved." '213 One Florida court reversed
a conviction because the children's testimony through videotape
was introduced without individualized findings.214 In only one
post-Coy opinion did a court uphold use of a videotaping proce-
dure without focusing on whether individualized findings had
been made. In that case, Strickland v. State," the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld introduction of a videotaped
deposition of a three-year-old. The court in that case held that
the implicated Alabama statute21 6 was "not repugnant to the
confrontation clause"21 7  because it provided for cross-
examination.
Although the courts, as well as a number of state statutes,
require individualized findings of trauma, few guidelines are
given concerning how these findings must be made.2"8 At a mini-
211. See id. at 2803 ("[Slomething more than the type of generalized findings [here]
... is needed.").
212. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. State v. Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. granted, No.
89SC25 (Colo. March 13, 1989) (LEXIS, States Library, Colo. file) (en banc).
214. See Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
215. No. 2 Div. 575 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988) (LEXIS, States Library, Ala.
file).
216. ALA. CODE § 15-21-1 (Supp. 1988).
217. Strickland, 2d Div. 575.
218. Compare ALA. CODE § 15-21-2(a) (Supp. 1988) ("[T]he court shall consider the
age and maturity of the child, the nature of the offense, the nature of testimony that
28
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times the child's testimony has been repeated.229
In addition to considering testimony from expert witnesses,
courts also should hear testimony from either the parents or
someone close to the child.2"' Although the court must consider
the witness's natural bias, this testimony will enable the court to
learn about changes in the child's behavior and the possible ef-
fects from the child's testifying in court.
Finally, a trial judge should personally interview the child
or examine the child's reactions to various court proceedings
since the decision to implement an alternate procedure ulti-
mately rests in the judge's hands. For example, the trial judge in
State v. Rivera23 1 observed that "[tihe child . . . suddenly
stopped [testifying] and refused to answer any more ques-
tions, '' 232 and also that "her fear which was reflected in her facial
expressions.
'233
Once the trial court has made these particularized findings,
the question becomes how traumatized or fearful must a child be
in order for the trial judge to find that a videotaping or closed-
circuit television procedure should be utilized? The wording
used and the degree of harm required vary significantly from
state to state. In New Mexico, the state code provides that the
videotaping procedure may be implemented if "the child is una-
ble to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable
and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. ' 23 4 Applying a
much lower standard, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld in-
troduction of a videotaped deposition that the trial court had
found admissible because a substantial likelihood existed that
the child would "suffer at least moderate emotional or mental
harm" 23 5 if required to testify. Such a procedure may be imple-
mented in Ohio if it would prevent "traumatization of the
child. '2 6 Finally, a child has been found in need of protection in
229. See Telephone interview with Geoffrey R. McKee, supra note 226; telephone
interview with Joshua Williams, supra note 226.
230. See Strickland v. State, No. 2 Div. 575 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 1988) (LEXIS,
States Library, Ala. file).
231. 141 Misc. 2d 1031, 535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
232. Id. at -, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
233. Id.
234. State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978)).
235. See Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 218 (Fla. 1988).
236. State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 307, 530 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1988).
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New York if he is deemed a "vulnerable witness. 2 37 Clearly
quantifying the harm or trauma necessary for implementation of
a child protection procedure is virtually impossible. This deter-
mination must be left in the hands of the trial judge who has the
benefit of testimony from experts, family members, and the
child.
B. Facing the Defendant
The second recommendation to legislatures attempting to
balance the rights of the criminal defendant against a desire to
protect sexual abuse victims relates to the defendant's presence
during the child's testimony. The majority of the post-Coy deci-
sions did not consider whether the defendant must be present
when one of these alternate methods of testimony was used. Coy
leaves open the question of whether any exceptions to the re-
quirement of face-to-face confrontation exist, and thereby gives
no guidance to the state courts that determine whether such ex-
ceptions are permissible. Coy, however, clearly states that the
confrontation clause requires eye-to-eye confrontation. 23 s The
face-to-face requirement helps to ensure that the witness will
testify truthfully and allows the trier of fact to examine the wit-
ness' demeanor. If a court allows a witness to testify outside of
the defendant's presence, the requirement of face-to-face-con-
frontation is thwarted. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning
in California v. Green,239 confrontation either at trial or when
the testimony is given will satisfy the requirements of the sixth
amendment.
The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed this precise issue in
State v. Eastham240 when it held that use of closed-circuit tele-
vision violated the defendant's constitutional rights. In Eastham
the trial judge implemented a procedure whereby the child, the
judge, both attorneys, and a court reporter were confined to a
room adjoining the courtroom, and a camera transmitted the
proceedings to the jury. The child could not see the defendant,
237. State v. Logan, 141 Misc. 2d 790, -, 535 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
238. Scalia wrote, "We have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses." Coy v. Iowa, 108
S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
239. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
2,10. 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988).
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times the child's testimony has been repeated.229
In addition to considering testimony from expert witnesses,
courts also should hear testimony from either the parents or
someone close to the child.230 Although the court must consider
the witness's natural bias, this testimony will enable the court to
learn about changes in the child's behavior and the possible ef-
fects from the child's testifying in court.
Finally, a trial judge should personally interview the child
or examine the child's reactions to various court proceedings
since the decision to implement an alternate procedure ulti-
mately rests in the judge's hands. For example, the trial judge in
State v. Rivera231 observed that "[t]he child . . . suddenly
stopped [testifying] and refused to answer any more ques-
tions, ' '23 and also that "her fear which was reflected in her facial
expressions."
233
Once the trial court has made these particularized findings,
the question becomes how traumatized or fearful must a child be
in order for the trial judge to find that a videotaping or closed-
circuit television procedure should be utilized? The wording
used and the degree of harm required vary significantly from
state to state. In New Mexico, the state code provides that the
videotaping procedure may be implemented if "the child is una-
ble to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable
and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. ' 234 Applying a
much lower standard, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld in-
troduction of a videotaped deposition that the trial court had
found admissible because a substantial likelihood existed that
the child would "suffer at least moderate emotional or mental
harm ' 235 if required to testify. Such a procedure may be imple-
mented in Ohio if it would prevent "traumatization of the
child. '23 6 Finally, a child has been found in need of protection in
229. See Telephone interview with Geoffrey R. McKee, supra note 226; telephone
interview with Joshua Williams, supra note 226.
230. See Strickland v. State, No. 2 Div. 575 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 1988) (LEXIS,
States Library, Ala. file).
231. 141 Misc. 2d 1031, 535 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
232. Id. at -, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
233. Id.
234. State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978)).
235. See Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 218 (Fla. 1988).
236. State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 307, 530 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1988).
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New York if he is deemed a "vulnerable witness. 23 7 Clearly
quantifying the harm or trauma necessary for implementation of
a child protection procedure is virtually impossible. This deter-
mination must be left in the hands of the trial judge who has the
benefit of testimony from experts, family members, and the
child.
B. Facing the Defendant
The second recommendation to legislatures attempting to
balance the rights of the criminal defendant against a desire to
protect sexual abuse victims relates to the defendant's presence
during the child's testimony. The majority of the post-Coy deci-
sions did not consider whether the defendant must be present
when one of these alternate methods of testimony was used. Coy
leaves open the question of whether any exceptions to the re-
quirement of face-to-face confrontation exist, and thereby gives
no guidance to the state courts that determine whether such ex-
ceptions are permissible. Coy, however, clearly states that the
confrontation clause requires eye-to-eye confrontation. 238 The
face-to-face requirement helps to ensure that the witness will
testify truthfully and allows the trier of fact to examine the wit-
ness' demeanor. If a court allows a witness to testify outside of
the defendant's presence, the requirement of face-to-face con-
frontation is thwarted. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning
in California v. Green,239 confrontation either at trial or when
the testimony is given will satisfy the requirements of the sixth
amendment.
The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed this precise issue in
State v. Eastham240 when it held that use of closed-circuit tele-
vision violated the defendant's constitutional rights. In Eastham
the trial judge implemented a procedure whereby the child, the
judge, both attorneys, and a court reporter were confined to a
room adjoining the courtroom, and a camera transmitted the
proceedings to the jury. The child could not see the defendant,
237. State v. Logan, 141 Misc. 2d 790, -, 535 N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
238. Scalia wrote, "We have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses." Coy v. Iowa, 108
S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
239. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
2,10. 39 Ohio St. 3d 307, 530 N.E.2d 409 (1988).
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who was seated in the courtroom. The court stated that the ap-
pellant's right of confrontation was violated by the procedure,
noting that "the child witness was totally cloistered from
appellant."
2 41
In fact, Justice O'Connor's concurrence implies that testi-
mony taken outside of court must be given while in the defend-
ant's presence. O'Connor stated, "Initially, many such proce-
dures may raise no substantial Confrontation Clause problem
since they involve testimony in the presence of the
defendant.
' '242
States have adopted alternate procedures for presenting a
child sexual abuse victim's testimony at trial to avoid subjecting
children to the trauma of testifying in front of their alleged
abuser.24 3 Allowing victims to testify at another time via video-
taped deposition or in another room through closed-circuit tele-
vision provides this protection. Nevertheless, as Scalia noted,
the defendant's right of confrontation "may, unfortunately, up-
set the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same
token it may confound and undo the false accuser. '244 Although
the defendant's right of confrontation may admit some excep-
tions, it may not be totally sacrificed by excluding a defendant
from all outside testimony. In addition, the defendant must be
informed prior to the taping of videotaped testimony that the
results will be introduced at trial. Defendants should consider
the testimony as the equivalent of trial testimony rather than as
merely discovery.
C. Procedures for Implementation
The third and final recommendation to be considered in the
wake of Coy concerns the methods used to transmit testimony
through videotape or closed-circuit television. The courts will
soon be faced with questions of how to implement alternate pro-
cedures. For example, may the camera focus only on the child's
face?
241. Id. at -, 530 N.E.2d at 411.
242. 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2804 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
243. See Strickland v. State, No. 2 Div. 575 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1988)
(LEXIS, States Library, Ala. file); Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
244. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
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In recent years, studies have been conducted on the extent
to which body language may reveal an individual's true state of
mind. One commentator has noted that we often act out our
feelings with nonverbal body language.245 A number of jury stud-
ies have been conducted to compare the effects of videotaped
testimony with live testimony at trial. Many of these studies in-
dicate that a trial's outcome is generally the same regardless of
whether testimony is live or taped. 46 Other studies, however, in-
dicate that use of videotaped testimony may have a substantial
effect at trial.247 In one study, jurors generally felt that the use
of videotape should be precluded in criminal proceedings.248 In
fact, one juror stated, "It is strictly a gut reaction on my part
because I simply feel that because of the seriousness of a crimi-
nal trial, absolutely every word that is spoken and absolutely
every emotion should be observed personally.
'249
Given the differences of opinion about whether videotaped
testimony is advisable, as well as the idea that nonverbal com-
munication affects trial proceedings, 250 in child sexual abuse
cases the camera should focus on the entire body of the child.
This will enable the jury to examine closely the witness's de-
245. See J. FAST. BODY LANGUAGE (1970).
246. See Miller, Bender, Boster, Florence, Fontes, Hocking & Nicholson, The Ef-
fects of Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials: Studies on Juror Decision Making, Infor-
mation Retention, and Emotional Arousal, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 331, 344 (1975) ("[W]e
find that the videotape trial format does not produce detrimental effects on juror re-
sponses."); Short, Florence & Marsh, An Assessment of Videotape in the Criminal
Courts, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 451 (1975) ("[The study's results] do suggest that the
behavioral and attitudinal impact of videotape recording is insignificant in relation to
other factors in the courtroom environment."); Miller, Televised Trials: How Do Juries
React?, 58 JUDICATURE 242, 246 (1974) ("[T]he results of the first study indicate that the
fears of [the videotape's] possible negative effects on the legal system are largely
groundless.").
247. See Williams, Farmer, Lee, Cundick, Howell, & Rooker, Juror Perceptions of
Trial Testimony as a Function of the Method of Presentation: A Comparison of Live,
Color Video, Black-and-White Video, Audio, and Transcript Presentations, 1975 B.Y.U.
L. RE V. 375, 410 (1975) ("[S]ignificant differences in juror perceptions did occur between
the media and live trials."); Bermant, Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch, & McGuire, Ju-
ror Responses to Prerecorded Videotape Trial Presentations in California and Ohio, 26
HASTINOS L.J. 975, 994 (1974-75) [hereinafter Bermant] ("Time and again in the jurors'
responses there appears a more or less explicit belief that there is a difference in the
outcome of a trial . . . produced by live versus taped testimony.").
248. See Bermant, supra note 247, at 994.
249. Id.
250. See LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom: Attorney Beware, 8
LAW AND PSy. REV. 83 (1984).
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meanor while testifying in his or her alleged attacker's presence.
In fact, cameras preferably should focus on both the witness and
the defendant so that the trier could gauge their reactions to
each other as well.251
Legislatures also may want to consider confining camera op-
erators behind screens, thereby reducing the number of stran-
gers the child would be required to face while his or her testi-
mony is recorded.252 Additionally, the focus and camera angle
should be specified. A fixed focus will avoid unnerving the child
as well as overdramatizing certain portions of the child's testi-
mony.2 53 Finally, the number of people permitted to attend the
videotaping and the location should be specified in order to
avoid any additional trauma to a child already deemed to be in
need of protection.
2 54
D. Post-Coy South Carolina
In at least one instance since the Supreme Court's decision
in Coy, a child victim's videotaped testimony has been intro-
duced in a criminal prosecution in South Carolina. In State v.
Murrel1255 the solicitor moved to have the videotaped deposition
251. This might be accomplished by using a split screen or by implementing two
cameras. Allowing the camera operator to pan back and forth between the defendant and
the child would allow that operator to use his judgment as to whom should be the focus
of the camera.
252. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988) ("The persons operating the
equipment shall be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror which
permits them to see and hear the child during his or her testimony."); TEX. CODE C0mM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) ("To the extent practicable, the per-
sons necessary to operate the equipment shall be confined to an adjacent room or behind
a screen or mirror that permits them to see and hear the child, .... but does not permit
the child to see or hear them.").
253. Rule 30(h)(2)(d) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies
to videotaped depositions, forbids use of close-up views of witnesses unless agreed upon
or ordered by the court. See S.C.R. Civ. P. 30(h)(2)(d).
254. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1988) ("Only the judge, attorneys
for the parties, persons necessary to operate the recording or broadcasting equipment,
and any person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the
child may be present in the room with the child during his or her testimony."); TEx.
CODE CRIAM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) ("To the extent practica-
ble, only the judge, the attorneys for the defendant and for the state, persons necessary
to operate the equipment, and any person whose presence would contribute to the wel-
fare and well-being of the child may be present in the room with the child during his
testimony.").
255. No. 88-GS-24-245 (Aug. 31, 1988 - Sept. 1, 1988).
35
Holmes: "Lights, Camera, Action": Videotaping and Closed-Circuit Televisi
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of a five-year-old child introduced 56 pursuant to South Caro-
lina's previously enacted Victims and Witness's Bill of Rights,257
a South Carolina statute allowing deposition testimony of rape
victims, 258 and pursuant to State v. Cooper.259 The court, after
hearing testimony of a child psychiatrist, the child's mother, and
the child's aunt, ordered that the child's testimony be taken by
videotape.260 Present at the videotaping session were the judge,
court reporter, child, both attorneys, and a support person for
the child. The defendant was precluded from the taping but was
able to view the proceedings and was in constant contact with
counsel. The videotaped testimony was taken about two weeks
prior to trial and was introduced at trial in lieu of live testimony
by the child.26 1 Thejury, which returned its verdict in two hours
and twenty-two minutes, convicted Murrell of criminal sexual
conduct with a minor.
262
South Carolina appellate courts have not considered a con-
stitutional challenge to the recently enacted statute.263 The stat-
ute likely will withstand facial challenge because it is limited to
family court proceedings for abuse and neglect.264 The provisions
of the sixth amendment are applicable only in criminal proceed-
ings; therefore, the defendant's right of confrontation is not im-
plicated. Although the provisions of this statute apply only in
family court, its application may implicate the defendant's fun-
damental right to family.
2 5
256. Solicitor's Notice of Motion & Motion to Allow Videotaped Interview of Minor
Child in Court (July 7, 1988).
257. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
258. That statute provides that "[b]efore or during the trial of a person charged
with rape or assault with intent to ravish, . . . the judge . . . may, in his discretion, by
an order direct that the deposition of such witness be taken at a time and place desig-
nated." Id. § 16-3-660.
259. 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451 (1987).
260. Record of Motion Hearing (July 29, 1988); Record of Motion Hearing (Aug. 9,
1988); Order (Aug. 18, 1988).
261. Telephone interview with Timothy W. Woolston, Assistant Solicitor in Green-
wood County (Feb. 10, 1989).
262. See Record at 200.
263. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
264. See id. § 19-1-180(A). This subsection reads:
An out-of-court statement made by a child under twelve years of age at the
time of the family court proceeding brought pursuant to Section 20-7-610 or
20-7-736 concerning an act of abuse or neglect. . . is admissible in the family
court proceeding if the requirements of this section are met.
265. Section 20-7-736(F) permits a petition for termination of parental rights. See
[Vol. 40
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South Carolina's new statute has been applied judiciously
thus far."6' Nevertheless, it may face constitutional challenge
when applied. Its application in a family court proceeding may
directly affect a criminal conviction in two ways. First, a child's
deposition may be introduced in a family court proceeding and
later in a criminal conviction under the hearsay exception for
prior sworn testimony.2' Second, a child's testimony introduced
through videotape in a family court proceeding could influence
plea negotiations in a pending criminal prosecution.2 68
If the provisions of the South Carolina statute are applied
in a criminal context and a child witness is permitted to testify
through videotaped deposition or closed-circuit television, the
statute will not pass constitutional muster. The statute seems to
equate the right of confrontation with the right to cross-examine
witnesses. 69 Section 19-1-180(B)(1), 27 0 which provides that a
child abuse victim's statement may be introduced either live at
trial, through videotaped deposition, or through closed-circuit
television, gives no guidance as to how either of these two alter-
nate procedures should be implemented. The defendant is not
required to be present when the child is deposed, leaving the
defendant's presence within the trial judge's discretion. No
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-736(F) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
266. The new South Carolina statute has been applied very few times since it was
enacted. Thus far, it has been applied only in family court proceedings. The solicitors'
offices generally are cautious in using the statute following the Supreme Court decision
in Coy. Telephone interview with Robert Hall, Assistant Solicitor in Spartanburg County
(Jan. 4, 1989); telephone interview with Catherine Christophilis, Assistant Solicitor in
Greenville County (Feb. 10, 1989); telephone interview with Timothy W. Woolston,
supra note 261.
267. Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits former testimony that
was subject to cross-examination to be introduced in a subsequent proceeding. See FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The declarant, however, must be found unavailable. Section 804(a)(4)
possibly may be applicable. That section provides that a declarant is unavailable if he is
"unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physi-
cal or mental illness or infirmity." FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4). A judge may refuse to admit
this prior testimony because of inherent unfairness to the defendant. See Telephone in-
terview with Catherine Christophilis, supra note 266.
268. If the attorneys for the prosecution and the defense felt that the child's testi-
mony in the family court proceeding had been particularly effective, the defendant might
be encouraged to plead guilty to a criminal charge against him. See Telephone interview
with Robert Hall, supra note 266.
269. Section 19-1-180(B)(1) provides that an out-of-court statement is admissible if
it was "subject to cross-examination." S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180(B)(1) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988).
270. Id.
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guidelines are given concerning camera angle or focus. In regard
to closed-circuit television, the statute indicates neither whether
a one-way or two-way method should be implemented nor the
manner through which the defendant may communicate with his
attorney. The South Carolina statute simply provides that the
child be subject to cross-examination at the time of his
testimony.
71
Perhaps an even greater infirmity is the statute's failure to
require particularized findings that a child would be traumatized
to some extent if required to testify in open court. If exceptions
to the defendant's right to-confrontation exist, Scalia's majority
opinion and O'Connor's concurrence in Coy, along with the vari-
ous post-Coy decisions, clearly show that particularized findings
are necessary to avoid constitutional infirmity. Section 19-1-
180(B)(2)(a)272 of the statute, which admits out-of-court state-
ments if the child is unavailable, lists a number of factors to be
considered by a trial judge. These factors, however, do not apply
to the previous subsection, which creates the exception for testi-
mony presented through videotape or closed-circuit television.
Additionally, section 19-1-180(E), 7 3 which requires the court to
place on the record findings of a witness's unavailability and the
trustworthiness of out-of-court statements, seems to apply only
to subsection (B)(2), which requires either unavailability or
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '274
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Coy v. Iowa dramatically
affects the various attempts made by state legislatures to protect
the victims of child sexual abuse. Coy.marks a definite move
away from prior Supreme Court cases holding that the central
provision of the confrontation clause was the right of cross-ex-
271. See id.
272. Id. § 19-1-180(B)(2)(a).
273. Id. § 19-1-180(E).
274. Id. § 19-1-180(B)(2)(b). Introduction of testimony either through videotaping
or closed-circuit television pursuant to South Carolina's Victims and Witness's Bill of
Rights, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1976), will face similar constitu-
tional pitfalls. That statute similarly gives no guidelines to the trial judge considering
introduction of testimony or to the solicitor seeking introduction. No particularized find-
ings are required nor are the defendant's presence and videotaping methods specified.
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amination. The majority opinion in Coy stated that the defend-
ant's right to come face-to-face with his accusers lies at the core
of the sixth amendment right of confrontation. The Court, how-
ever, left open the question of whether any exceptions to this
right exist, that is, whether the states in fact can use videotaping
or closed-circuit television to present a child victim's testimony.
If the Supreme Court subsequently determines that the de-
fendant's right of face-to-face confrontation does allow excep-
tions supported by public policy, a majority of states likely will
provide that the testimony of a child sexual abuse victim may be
presented through videotaped deposition or closed-circuit televi-
sion. If either procedure is implemented, as both have been in
South Carolina, three recommendations may be extrapolated
from the opinions in Coy, from the cases decided thereafter, and
from balancing the defendant's sixth amendment rights against
society's desire to protect the victims of abuse.
First, a trial judge considering implementation of these al-
ternate procedures must make individualized findings that a
particular child would be traumatized if required to testify in
court. The judge making this finding should consider testimony
from expert witnesses, parents oi close family members, and
should personally interview the child. Second, the defendant
must be present when the testimony is given. Finally, the follow-
ing should be considered: (1) confining camera operators behind
screens; (2) the focus and angle of the camera; (3) the number of
people permitted to be present while the testimony is taken; and
(4) the location to be used for the testimony.
In conclusion, children who are victims of the emotional and
physical trauma of sexual abuse may be afforded some protec-
tion from the harm they suffer in the hands of the judicial sys-
tem. The heinousness of the alleged crimes, however, cannot
blind courts and legislatures to the constitutional guarantees
provided by the sixth amendment.
Stephanie Ann Holmes
19891
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